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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2006).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Because of the confusing procedural history of this case, stating the issues on
appeal first requires some context. This case involves a medical malpractice claim
brought by Rebekah Munson ("Ms. Munson") against Dr. Chamberlain and Central Utah
Medical Clinic (collectively "Dr. Chamberlain"). Prior to the commencement of the
lawsuit, Ms. Munson submitted her case for review by a prelitigation review panel as
required by the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act (the "Act").1 Ms. Munson submitted to
the panel both a Notice of Intent to Commence Action ("Notice of Intent") and an
opinion letter prepared by her expert at the time, Dr. Kane ("Opinion Letter"). Under the
Act, these documents thereafter were confidential, privileged, and immune from the civil
process. After the prelitigation hearing, Ms. Munson hired a new expert, Dr. Jacobs, to
serve as her testifying expert at trial and provided him the Opinion Letter and the Notice
of Intent. After discovering on the eve of trial that Dr. Jacobs had reviewed these
confidential materials, Dr. Chamberlain moved to disqualify Dr. Jacobs from testifying at
trial as a sanction for failing to keep the materials confidential. The trial court ruled that
Ms. Munson had breached the confidentiality of the proceedings before the panel, but
denied Dr. Chamberlain's motion and instead only declared a mistrial as a sanction.
As discussed below, it is unclear whether Ms. Munson is appealing from the order
declaring a mistrial, the order denying her motion to reconsider the order declaring a
1

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1, et seq.
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mistrial (which is the only order listed on the Notice of Appeal), or the final order
granting summary judgment to Dr. Chamberlain (the basis of which Ms. Munson does
not seem to dispute). In light of the confusion, Dr. Chamberlain will address all three
possibilities, but will assume that Ms. Munson has properly appealed from the order
declaring a mistrial since that order is the focus of the opening brief. If this assumption is
correct, then there are two separate issues for the Court to review.
Issue 1: Did the trial court err by ruling that Ms. Munson violated the statutory
requirement to keep the proceedings before the prelitigation panel confidential when she
provided to her testifying expert both the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter, which were
prepared for, presented to, and considered by the prelitigation panel?
Standard of Review: Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, ^{10, 138 P.3d 599.
Issue 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by declaring a mistrial as a sanction
for Ms. Munson having violated the statutory requirement to keep the proceedings before
the panel confidential, where a mistrial preserved Ms. Munson's claims and afforded her
the opportunity to obtain a new expert to assist in the prosecution of her case?
Standard cf Review: A trial court's choice of sanction, including an order for
mistrial, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted).

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(d).
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The determinative statutory provision of this appeal is Utah Code section 78-1412(l)(d), which provides that "[proceedings conducted [by the prelitigation review
panel] are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." Id. A copy of this
section is attached as Addendum 1.
The determinative judicial interpretation of this section is found in Doe v. Maret
1999 UT 74, 984 P.2d 980, which held that the confidentiality of the prelitigation
proceedings encompasses any documents submitted to the review panel and that
sanctions are appropriate for a breach of confidentiality. Id. at ^[21. A copy of this
opinion is attached as Addendum 2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Before Ms. Munson filed her complaint against Dr. Chamberlain, she first
presented her medical malpractice claim to the prelitigation review panel, as required by
the Act. (R. at 3, ^f 6.) Ms. Munson prepared for, and presented to, the prelitigation panel
a Notice of Intent to Commence Action ("Notice of Intent") and an opinion letter
prepared by her expert at the time, Dr. Kane ("Opinion Letter"), both of which were
considered by the panel. (R. at 262, ^ 3.) Under Utah Code section 78-14-12(l)(d), the
documents thereafter were confidential, privileged, and immune from the civil process.
After filing her complaint, Ms. Munson provided the two confidential documents
to her testifying expert, Dr. Jacobs. (R. 556, Def s. Ex. 1.) Dr. Chamberlain did not
discover that Dr. Jacobs had reviewed these documents until just before trial while
preparing a cross-examination outline. (R. at 554, p. 5.) Dr. Chamberlain immediately
413031
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filed a motion to disqualify Dr. Jacobs from testifying at trial. (R. at 240.) Judge Lynn
W. Davis, the trial court judge at the time, carefully considered the motion and ruled that
Ms. Munson had violated the confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings. (R. at 260.)
Instead of granting Dr. Chamberlain's motion to disqualify and leaving Ms. Munson
without an expert at trial, however, Judge Davis ordered a mistrial, thus preserving Ms.
Munson's cause of action for another day. (R. at 259, H 9; 260,fflf5, 7.)
After nearly two years of inactivity, Dr. Chamberlain filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Ms. Munson's claim required expert testimony and she had no
expert to testify on her behalf at trial. (R. at 332.) In response, instead of simply
retaining a new expert and proceeding to trial, Ms. Munson filed a motion to reconsider
the order of mistrial. (R. at 370.) On April 24, 2006, Judge Pullan denied the motion to
reconsider and granted Dr. Chamberlain's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 543-44.)
On May 8, 2006, Ms. Munson filed a Notice of Appeal in which she states that she is
seeking review only of Judge Pullan's ruling on her motion to reconsider. (R. at 551.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Ms. Munson claims that Dr. Chamberlain misdiagnosed her medical condition and
erroneously prescribed steroids for treatment. (R. at 2,1fl7.) Before Ms. Munson could
file a medical malpractice complaint, however, she was required to submit her case to a
prelitigation review panel. As required by the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Ms.
Munson prepared a Notice of Intent to Commence Action ("Notice of Intent") and
submitted it to the prelitigation panel. (R. at 3, ^ 6.) Ms. Munson also submitted to the

413031
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panel an opinion letter drafted by her medical expert at the time, Dr. Kane (the "Opinion
Letter"). (R. at 262, % 3; 554, 8-9.)
On October 19, 2001, Ms. Munson filed her complaint against Dr. Chamberlain.
(R. at 4.) To help prosecute her case, Ms. Munson hired a new expert, Dr. Jacobs, on the
recommendation of Dr. Kane, to serve as her testifying expert at trial. (R. at 554, p. 9.)
Ms. Munson provided Dr. Jacobs a number of documents, including both the Notice of
Intent and the Opinion Letter, to assist Dr. Jacobs in forming his expert opinions in the
case. (R. at 262 f 3-5; R. at 556, Def s. Ex. 1.) A letter from Ms. Munson's attorney to
Dr. Jacobs describes the Notice of Intent as a document that "outlines the facts and
liability issues of the case." (R. at 556, Def s. Ex. 1, attached hereto as Addendum 5.)
In preparation for trial, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel discovered that Dr. Jacobs had
been provided the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter, which constituted a breach of the
confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings. (R. at 554, p. 5.) Because these materials
were confidential, counsel for Dr. Chamberlain was not able to introduce these
documents into evidence and question Dr. Jacobs about them. (R. at 554, p. 8.) The
inability to cross-examine Dr. Jacobs about the confidential documents was significant
because the documents demonstrate how Dr. Jacobs had simply adopted the earlier
opinion of Dr. Kane and that Dr. Jacobs had done a superficial job of research while
forming his opinions. (R. 554, pp. 7-9.) Without the ability to introduce the confidential
documents, Dr. Chamberlain was unable to point out how Dr. Jacobs' opinion largely
parroted Dr. Kane's earlier opinion. (See id.) Accordingly, Dr. Chamberlain moved to
disqualify Dr. Jacobs from testifying at trial. (R. at 262, ^f 2.)

413031
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On February 25, 2004, during the first day of the bench trial, Judge Davis heard
oral argument on the motion to disqualify. (R. at 554.) Relying on Doe v. Maret 1999
UT 74, 984 P.2d 980, Judge Davis ruled that Ms. Munson had breached the
confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings by providing to her testifying expert
documents prepared for and considered by the prelitigation panel. (R. at 260-261.)
Judge Davis found the breach to be "grave and serious" and ruled that it warranted
sanctions. (Id.)
Judge Davis considered three possible sanctions: (i) simply grant Dr.
Chamberlain's motion to disqualify and grant a directed verdict to Dr. Chamberlain, as
Ms. Munson would then have no expert to testify on her behalf; (ii) allow Dr. Jacobs to
testify and permit Dr. Chamberlain's counsel to cross-examine him about his reliance on
the privileged prelitigation documents, thereby requiring Dr. Chamberlain's counsel also
to breach confidentiality during cross-examination; and (iii) declare a mistrial to provide
Ms. Munson the opportunity to retain another expert. (R. at 260.) Ultimately, the trial
court found a mistrial to be the "most equitable sanction" because it preserved Ms.
Munson's cause of action. (R. at 259, ^j 9; see also R. at 554, p. 39.)
On June 30, 2005, sixteen months after Judge Davis had declared a mistrial, the
trial court received notice that Ms. Munson had filed bankruptcy. (R. at 323-26; 407.) In
her bankruptcy, Ms. Munson did not list her claims against Dr. Chamberlain as an asset
with any value. (Id.) The Statement of Financial Affairs and Schedule B of Munson's
bankruptcy filing specifically ask about pending lawsuits, but Ms. Munson did not
mention her claim in either document, and it ultimately was not discharged. (R. at 407.)

413031
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On October 25, 2005, Dr. Chamberlain moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Ms. Munson could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice
without a testifying expert. (R. at 331-332.) Dr. Chamberlain argued that despite the fact
Judge Davis had preserved Ms. Munson's cause of action almost two years earlier, Ms.
Munson had failed to retain an expert to testify on her behalf. (See R. at 555, p. 45.) In
response, Ms. Munson did not retain an expert, but instead filed a motion to reconsider
the order of mistrial issued by Judge Davis. (R. at 370.) Ms. Munson argued that
manifest injustice would result if the trial court did not vacate the order of mistrial. (R. at
362.)
On March 29, 2006, Judge Derek Pullan heard oral argument on both motions. (R.
at 541.) Judge Pullan found no grounds to reconsider Judge Davis's earlier ruling or
choice of sanction and therefore denied Ms. Munson's motion. (R. at 544-45.) When
asked about Dr. Chamberlain's motion for summary judgment, counsel for Ms. Munson
admitted that he had no expert witness and therefore could not establish a prima facie
case of negligence against Dr. Chamberlain. (Id.) The trial court then granted summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Chamberlain. (Id.)
On May 8, 2006, Ms. Munson filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. at 551.) In the notice
of appeal, Ms. Munson states that she is appealing from Judge Pullan's disposition of her
motion to reconsider and does not mention the order granting Dr. Chamberlain's motion

3

In Ms. Munson's memorandum in opposition to Dr. Chamberlain's motion for summary
judgment, she explained that she lacked the financial resources to retain an expert but
nonetheless was fully prepared to "pursue the matter through the appellate courts." (R.
398.)
413031
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for summary judgment or Judge Davis's order of mistrial. (Id.) In the docketing
statement, however, Ms. Munson challenges the correctness of the order granting
summary judgment, but only insofar as it relates to Judge Pullan's denial of Ms.
Munson's motion to reconsider. (See Docketing Statement at 2.) Then, in the opening
brief, Ms. Munson states that the two rulings at issue are Judge Pullan's order granting
summary judgment and Judge Davis's original order of mistrial, neither of which are
listed in the notice of appeal. (Aplt. Brief at 1.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
As discussed in detail below, it is unclear from which order Ms. Munson is
appealing. However, out of an abundance of caution, Dr. Chamberlain will assume that
Ms. Munson has properly appealed from Judge Davis's order declaring a mistrial on
February 25, 2004, even though the notice of appeal mentions only Judge Pullan's order
denying Ms. Munson's motion for reconsideration on March 29, 2006.
The final judgment in this case stems from Judge Pullan's granting of Dr.
Chamberlain's motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that Ms. Munson
could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice without a testifying expert.
At oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for Ms. Munson
conceded both that expert testimony was required to prove Ms. Munson's medical
malpractice claim and that Ms. Munson had no expert to testify on her behalf. Therefore,
there is no dispute that Judge Pullan's grant of summary judgment was correct.

413031
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Ms. Munson instead argues that Judge Davis incorrectly ruled she had breached
the confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings, and therefore, erred by ordering a
mistrial. Ms. Munson's argument comes down to an assertion that the rule followed by
Judge Davis—and later Judge Pullan—will create chaos in medical malpractice cases. In
particular, Munson argues that if the trial court's ruling is upheld, then expert witnesses
could not view any information presented to the prelitigation review panel, including a
claimant's medical records, without the disclosure leading to a mistrial. (Aplt. Brief at
8.) As Ms. Munson puts it, if medical records, for example, are reviewed by the
prelitigation review panel, then "expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases are no
longer authorized to view the alleged medical records relating to the alleged
malpractice." (IdL at p. 28.)
The chaotic picture painted by Ms. Munson is based upon her failure to draw three
key distinctions. The first distinction Ms. Munson fails to draw is between the trial
court's ruling that she had breached confidentiality and the trial court's choice of sanction
for that breach. This distinction is important because the trial court's decision to order a
mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, whereas its ruling that Ms.
Munson had violated the statutory mandate that the materials submitted to the
prelitigation panel remain confidential is reviewed for correctness. Much of Ms.
Munson's argument takes issue with the sanction imposed by Judge Davis, not the initial
ruling concerning breach of confidentiality. Because trial courts enjoy great discretion in
choosing an appropriate sanction, there is little chance that the chaotic picture painted by
Ms. Munson will result.

413031
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The sanction imposed by Judge Davis illustrates the point. Not only was the
choice of sanction—mistrial—not an abuse of discretion, it was the sanction that best
served Ms. Munson's interests. The trial court could have precluded Ms. Munson's
expert from testifying and then granted a directed verdict in favor of Dr. Chamberlain
because she did not have an expert for trial. Instead, Judge Davis chose the least
restrictive sanction that protected the rights of all parties while respecting the
confidentiality of documents submitted to the prelitigation panel. As Judge Davis
explained in his order, "the Court would like to impose a sanction that would preserve
Plaintiffs case." (R. 260.) Far from an abuse of discretion, the choice of sanction was
the most equitable choice under the circumstances.
The other two distinctions Ms. Munson fails to draw similarly support Judge
Davis's ruling that Ms. Munson breached the confidentiality of the prelitigation
proceedings. The second distinction Ms. Munson fails to draw is between the underlying
facts of her case and documents specifically prepared for, presented to, and considered by
the prelitigation panel. No confidentiality attaches to the underlying facts; otherwise, no
case could ever proceed beyond the prelitigation proceedings. The documents prepared
for the prelitigation panel, however, are, by statute, absolutely "confidential, privileged,
and immune from civil process." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(d).
The only burden this places on plaintiffs is the same burden that existed before
prelitigation panels were created: Plaintiffs must prove their claims using evidence that
would have existed if there were no prelitigation process. The underlying facts can be
considered by any retained expert; experts simply cannot review the documents prepared

413031
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for and submitted to the panel, especially if they are testifying experts. Therefore, to use
Ms. Munson's example, there is no statutory prohibition on disclosing a plaintiffs
medical records because these documents were not prepared for the prelitigation panel,
but there is a prohibition on disclosing the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter, both of
which were specifically prepared for the prelitigation panel. The Legislature's choice to
treat materials presented to the prelitigation panel as "confidential, privileged, and
immune from civil process" is a sensible one. It has not and will not lead to chaos.
The third distinction Ms. Munson fails to draw is between a testifying expert
witness and a consulting expert. If Ms. Munson had revealed the confidential documents
to a consulting expert, the confidentiality of the documents likely would have been
preserved. Ms. Munson, however, revealed the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter to
Dr. Jacobs, her testifying expert witness. In so doing, Ms. Munson exposed those
confidential documents to the disclosure requirements of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and to disclosure during cross-examination of Dr. Jacobs. Therefore, the
rule followed by the trial court does not entail that parties can never share confidential
documents with experts, as Ms. Munson suggests, but instead merely requires attorneys
to follow what is already common practice: Attorneys cannot disclose confidential or
privileged documents to their own testifying expert witnesses without risking waiver or
sanction. Again, the rule makes perfect sense.
The rule followed by Judge Davis is a sensible rule that will not lead to chaos as
Ms. Munson suggests. Assuming Ms. Munson has properly appealed Judge Davis's
order declaring a mistrial, the Court should affirm the trial court's (i) ruling that Ms.
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Munson breached confidentiality by providing confidential documents to her testifying
expert and (ii) choice of sanction, which was the only solution that preserved the rights of
Ms. Munson and respected the statutorily imposed confidentiality of the prelitigation
proceedings.
ARGUMENT
As an initial matter, the basis of Ms. Munson's appeal requires clarification, as it
is unclear from which order Ms. Munson is appealing, which issues have been presented
to the Court, and what standard of review is applicable. In the Notice of Appeal, Ms.
Munson states that she is appealing only from the disposition of her "Motion to
Reconsider the Order of Mistrial entered by the above-entitled Court on April 24, 2006."
(Notice of Appeal, attached as Addendum 3.) A trial court's decision not to reconsider a
prior ruling, however, cannot constitute a final judgment or order that "disposes of the
claims of the parties." Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, TJ12, 37 P. 3d 1070. Any order
denying a motion to reconsider merely maintains the status quo, and thus, cannot itself
constitute a final order. Insofar Ms. Munson has appealed only from the order denying
her motion to reconsider, then this Court lacks jurisdiction and should dismiss Ms.
Munson's appeal. See id.; Utah R. App. P. 3(a).
Ms. Munson's Docketing Statement then lists the following issue5 which was not
encompassed by the notice of appeal: "Whether the trial court erred in then granting
Defendants' request for summary judgment." (Docketing Statement at 2.) While the
order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Chamberlain did "dispose of the claims
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of the parties" and therefore an appeal from it would provide the Court jurisdiction, Ms.
Munson does not take issue with the grounds of Dr. Chamberlain's motion for summary
judgment.4 Ms. Munson disputes neither that she needed expert testimony to establish a
prima facie case for medical malpractice nor that she had no expert for trial. Instead, Ms.
Munson appears to take issue with the order granting summary judgment only insofar as
it depends upon the trial court's simultaneous denial of her motion to reconsider, which,
in essence, is no different than appealing from the denial of the motion to reconsider
itself.
This is significant, because, assuming the Court has jurisdiction to entertain Ms.
Munson's appeal, if Ms. Munson is appealing only the trial court's denial of her motion
to reconsider (via an appeal from the order granting summary judgment), then the
standard of review for every issue she raises is abuse of discretion. Issues that would
normally be reviewed for correctness are reviewed for abuse of discretion when
embedded in a motion to reconsider. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah
1996) ("A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider summary
judgment is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its ruling
absent an abuse of discretion.") Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Ms. Munson's motion to reconsider. Ms. Munson failed to demonstrate that
there had been a change in the governing law, there was new evidence, or that manifest
injustice would result if the court failed to reconsider its prior ruling. See Trembly v.
Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310-11 (Utah Ct App. 1994). Therefore, insofar
4

A copy of Judge Pullan's order granting summary judgment is attached as Addendum 4.
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as Ms. Munson has properly appealed the denial of her motion to reconsider, the Court
should affirm the trial court's ruling as a proper use of its discretion.
Ms. Munson's opening brief provides yet another picture of the issues before the
Court. What is clear in the opening brief is that Ms. Munson's primary contention now is
that Judge Davis erred by ordering a mistrial. (Aplt. Brief at 1.) What is unclear is which
aspects of Judge Davis's order Ms. Munson is challenging in her opening brief. When
setting forth the Issue Presented, Ms. Munson presents only one issue for the Court to
review.5 In the Argument section, however, Ms. Munson presents two distinct issues,
each carrying a different standard of review.
Consistent with the Issue Presented, Ms. Munson first argues that the trial court
erred as a matter of law when it ruled she had violated the confidentiality of the
prelitigation proceedings. (Id. at 12-20.) Ms. Munson then argues, however, that the trial
court also erred by failing to implement remedies other than ordering a mistrial, such as
permitting only "a limited examination of Dr. Jacobs in camera," or "clearing] the
courtroom" during Dr. Jacob's testimony, or allowing "that portion of the crossexamination under seal," or ordering counsel for Dr. Chamberlain to cross-examine "Dr.
Jacobs regarding the documenting in question without ever discussing the prelitigation
panel at all." (Aplt. Brief at 22-24.) Ms. Munson concludes that because these
alternative remedies were available, the trial court erred by excluding Dr. Jacobs as a
5

The sole issue presented by Ms. Munson is as follows: "Whether a retained expert
witness in a medical malpractice action should be absolutely prohibited under Utah Code
Annotated § 78-14-12 (2005) from viewing the documents, reports, or medical records
relating to the malpractice case, simply because those documents were also submitted to
the prelitigation panel for its own review." (Aplt. Brief at 1.)
413031

14

witness and declaring a mistrial. (See id. at 24.) These arguments challenge the sanction
selected by Judge Davis, not the legal issue of whether disclosure of the prelitigation
documents to Dr. Jacobs breached confidentiality. While it is understandable that Ms.
Munson would prefer the Court to construe all of the issues she presents as pure
questions of law, a trial court's decision to declare a mistrial as a sanction, instead of
some other sanction, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109,
1111 (Utah Ct.App. 1998).
In light of the confusing procedural history and contradictory statements in the
papers filed by Ms. Munson, out of an abundance of caution, Dr. Chamberlain will
assume that the following two issues raised in the Argument section of the opening brief
are properly before the Court: (i) Did the trial court err by ruling that Ms. Munson
violated the statutory requirement to keep the proceedings before the prelitigation panel
confidential when she provided to Dr. Jacobs both the Notice of Intent and Opinion
Letter, and (ii) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by declaring a mistrial as a sanction
for Ms. Munson having provided the two documents to Dr. Jacobs.
I.

MS, MUNSON DOES NOT DISPUTE THE GROUNDS FOR THE TRIAL
COURT'S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PR,
CHAMBERLAIN.
The final judgment in this case—from which Ms. Munson does not appeal in the

Notice of Appeal—stems from Judge Pullan's granting of summary judgment to Dr.
Chamberlain over two years after the ruling by Judge Davis that Ms. Munson takes issue
with in her opening brief. Judge Davis ruled that Ms. Munson had breached the
confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings on February 25, 2004, and as a result he
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declared a mistrial. Ms. Munson did not seek appellate review of this ruling or ask Judge
Davis to reconsider it. Instead, she waited nearly two years before asking for
reconsideration of Judge Davis's ruling, and only then in response to Dr. Chamberlain's
motion for summary judgment filed on October 25, 2005, and after having represented to
the bankruptcy court that her claim against Dr. Chamberlain had no value.
In Dr. Chamberlain's motion for summary judgment, he argued that Ms. Munson
could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice without a testifying expert.
Dr. Chamberlain argued that despite the fact Judge Davis had preserved Ms. Munson's
cause of action almost two years earlier, Ms. Munson had failed to retain an expert to
testify on her behalf. At oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for
Ms. Munson conceded both that expert testimony was required to prove Ms. Munson's
medical malpractice claim and that Ms. Munson had no expert to testify on her behalf.
(R. at 544-45.) Therefore, there is no question—and it appears no dispute on appeal—
that Judge Pullan's grant of summary judgment was correct.
Instead, the only question raised by Ms. Munson in her opening brief is whether
Judge Davis's original ruling on February 25, 2004, was correct. It is to this issue that
Dr. Chamberlain now turns.
IL

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MS. MUNSON
BREACHED THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE PRELITIGATION
PROCEEDINGS BY DISCLOSING CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS TO A
TESTIFYING EXPERT.
Under the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act (the "Act"), prior to commencing a

medical liability claim a plaintiff must first serve a notice of intent to commence action
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against the health care provider and file a request for review of the potential claim by a
prelitigation review panel. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-8, -12. The prelitigation panel
will then issue a decision concerning "whether each claim against each health care
provider has merit or has no merit and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of
resulted in harm to the claimant." Id. at § 78-14-14. The plaintiff is then free to file a
complaint in district court alleging the medical liability claim.
The stated purpose of the Act is to provide "procedural changes to expedite early
evaluation and settlement of claims." Id. at § 78-14-2. Consistent with this stated
purpose, the proceedings before the prelitigation panel are confidential, much like
settlement negotiations are confidential and therefore inadmissible under Rule 408 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Utah R. Evid. 408 ("Evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations is . .. not admissible."). Like Rule 408, "[e]vidence of the
proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and its results, opinions, findings,
and determination are not admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by
the clamant in a court of competent jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-15(1).
However, unlike Rule 408, the Act does not stop there to ensure frank and open
discussion before the panel. It also provides, in a separate section, that the proceedings
"are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." Id, at § 78-14-12(l)(d).
Interpreting this section, and consistent with the purpose of the Act, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that any document "utilized as part of the prelitigation review . . . is part
of the proceeding and must be kept confidential." Doe v. Maret 1999 UT 74, ^[21, 984
P.2d 980. Failure to keep such documents confidential may "result in sanctions." Id
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Ms. Munson does not dispute that (i) the plain language of the Act classifies
evidence submitted to the prelitigation panel as confidential, (ii) the legislative intent was
to keep the documents presented to the panel confidential, (iii) the legislative purpose is
served by keeping the documents presented to the panel confidential, or (iv) the Utah
Supreme Court has held that the documents must remain confidential and failure to do so
will result in sanctions. Instead, Ms. Munson asks the Court to overturn the holding of
the Utah Supreme Court in Maret (Aplt. Brief at 32-34), refuse to enforce the statue
because it produces "absurd results," (see id. at 26-32), and, in any event, carve out an
exception for testifying experts, even though the statute plainly states that evidence
before the prelitigation panel is inadmissible, confidential, privileged, and immune from
civil process. (See id. at 8-21.) As demonstrated below, there is no reason for the Court
to adopt any of these drastic measures. Keeping documents prepared for and considered
by the prelitigation panel confidential furthers the important legislative purpose of the
Act and prejudices no one.
A.

This Court Lacks the Authority to Overturn the Utah Supreme Court
Decision in Maret and There is No Reason to Do So Even if the Court
Did Have the Authority,

The first route suggested by Ms. Munson can be dispensed with in short order.
This Court lacks the authority to overturn Maret even if the Utah Supreme Court had
misinterpreted the statute, which it did not. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3
(Utah 1994) (explaining this Court's duty to adhere strictly to Utah Supreme Court
precedent, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis); State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^[21,
84 P.3d 841 ("Only the Utah Supreme Court can correct any deficiencies in [its
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precedent].").
In any event, the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in Maret is
entirely sensible. Under Utah law, the primary goal of appellate courts "in interpreting
statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004
UT 75, f 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (quotations and citation omitted). In addition, courts
"presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, *|9, 977
P.2d 479 (quotations and citation omitted). Further, courts "read the plain language of
the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the
same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592.
Here, the plain language, legislative intent, legislative purpose, and surrounding
provisions all suggest that section 78-14-12(l)(d) should be interpreted to prohibit the
disclosure and future use of any documents prepared for and submitted to the
prelitigation panel. As the Supreme Court put it in Maret, any document "utilized as part
of the prelitigation review . . . is part of the proceeding and must be kept confidential."
1999 UT 74 at f21. And there is no question that Maret reflects the intent of the
Legislature. As Ms. Munson points out in her opening brief, the Legislature amended
section 78-14-12 in 2002, but did not alter the language in section 78-14-12(l)(d)
interpreted in Maret. (Aplt. Brief at 10.) If Maret created the chaos suggested by Ms.
Munson, one would have expected the Legislature to have stepped in, or at least for
another case questioning Maret to have made its way to an appellate court. The fact is,
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litigants have had no problems complying with Maret which announces a straightforward
and sensible interpretation of section 78-14-12(l)(d). Even if this Court had the authority
to overturn a holding of the Utah Supreme Court, it should not do so in this case.
Under the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation in Maret, there is no question that
Ms. Munson breached the confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings. Both the
Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter were prepared for and utilized by the prelitigation
panel. Under the express holding of Maret a notice of intent is privileged and
confidential under the statute. 1999 UT 74 at ^[21. The Opinion Letter is no different.
Ms. Munson's expert at the time of the prelitigation hearing, Dr. Kane, drafted the
Opinion Letter for use in the prelitigation proceedings. (R. at 555, p. 5.) And like the
Letter of Intent, the Opinion Letter was submitted to the panel, and the panel utilized it in
its review. (R. at 262, f 3.) The Opinion Letter also qualifies as a part of the prelitigation
proceedings and is therefore confidential, privileged, and immune from the civil process.
Ms. Munson does not dispute that she provided both of these documents to her testifying
expert, Dr. Jacobs, who would have to testify in open court and be subject to crossexamination concerning the documents he reviewed and the bases of his opinions.
Therefore, by providing these documents to Dr. Jacobs, Ms. Munson breached the
confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings, as provided by the Legislature in section
78-14-12(l)(d).
B.

Interpreting Section 78-14-12 to Prohibit Ms, Munson from Revealing
Prelitigation Documents to Her Testifying Expert Does Not Lead To
"Absurd Results."

Instead of arguing that Judge Davis misread the statute, or that his interpretation
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conflicts with the Legislature's intent or purpose, or that his interpretation fails to follow
precedent, Ms. Munson appeals to the rarely used canon of statutory construction that
courts should "construe statutes to ensure that there will be no absurd results." (Aplt.
Brief at 26.) However, as long as there is a reasonable interpretation of the statute, it "is
axiomatic that [the] statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction."
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,1f9, 94 P.3d 234 (quotations and
citation omitted). Here, the only way to make the statute appear absurd is by failing to
draw two reasonable distinctions: (i) between documents prepared for the prelitigation
panel and the underlying facts of the case and (ii) between a breach of confidentiality and
the array of possible sanctions that could be imposed by a trial court for that breach.
Once these distinctions are attended to, Judge Davis's interpretation of section 78-1412(l)(d), far from being absurd, is the only reasonable interpretation.
1.

Section 78-14-12(l)(d) Prevents Disclosure of Documents
Prepared For, Presented To, and Considered By the
Prelitigation Panel; It Does Not Prevent Disclosure of the
Underlying Facts of the Case,

Ms. Munson argues that the Court should not interpret section 78-14-12(l)(d)
according to its plain language because to do so will lead to absurd results. Specifically,
Ms. Munson argues that, under Judge Davis's interpretation of the statute, if medical
records were submitted to the prelitigation panel, then they could not thereafter be shared
with expert witnesses. (Aplt. Brief at 27-28.) This argument fails to recognize the
distinction between documents specifically prepared for the prelitigation panel and the
underlying facts of the case. While section 78-14-12(l)(d) plainly forbids disclosure of
documents specifically prepared for and presented to the panel, it does not render every
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bit of information contained in those documents confidential and inadmissible at trial. As
long as the information can be obtained independent of the prelitigation proceedings, then
it is not confidential under the statute. This distinction is fundamental, and it undermines
Ms. Munson's attempt to construe the statute as absurd.
Like the attorney-client privilege, the confidentiality provision of section 78-1412(l)(d) protects confidential communications, not the underlying facts that inform those
communications. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote
communication and the free exchange of information between the lawyer and the client.
Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Res. Corp.. 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990)
(stating that the privilege is "intended to encourage candor between attorney and client
and promote the best possible representation of the client"). The Legislature's purpose in
enacting the Act was to provide procedures, such as the prelitigation review panel, to
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2.
Confidentiality in these proceedings functions like the attorney-client privilege in that it
promotes frank discussion and full disclosure. This enables the prelitigation panel to
fulfill its purpose of evaluating claims and facilitating settlement. However, just as one
cannot render facts inadmissible merely by uttering them to one's attorney, one cannot
render facts—such as those reflected in medical records—confidential merely by
presenting them to the prelitigation panel. This distinction is fundamental and embedded
in the law of privilege. See Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 315,
495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1972) (stating that a person "cannot foreclose the discovery
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process by the simple expedient of funneling [information] into its counsel's custody").
There is no reason to interpret section 78-14-12(l)(d) any differently.
The distinction is also embedded in Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
which provides that "[t]his rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations."
Utah R. Evid. 408. While one cannot render factual evidence inadmissible by reciting it
during settlement negotiations, documents prepared for and exchanged during settlement
negotiations are nonetheless inadmissible even if they contain some information that is
otherwise discoverable. This distinction is sensible, and there is no reason to read section
78-12-14(l)(d) any differently, especially in light of its similar purpose "to expedite early
evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2.
A clear distinction exists between the facts of this case—as represented in, for
example, medical records—and the confidential documents at issue in this appeal.
Although the content of the Opinion Letter cannot be discussed here, in general, an
opinion letter does not merely recite facts, but instead interprets and analyzes facts—such
as those contained in medical records—and arrives at a conclusion as to what the facts
mean. Also, unlike medical records, the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter were created
specifically for the prelitigation panel. The Notice of Intent and especially the Opinion
Letter frame, analyze, and opine as to the nature of the facts and the strength of a
claimant's case. There is no reason to interpret section 78-14-12(l)(d) to render medical
records confidential and therefore inadmissible simply because they are submitted to the
prelitigation panel.
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2.

Any Harsh Result Stemming From Section 78-14-12(l)(d) Can
Be Mitigated by the Trial Court's Choice of Sanction.

In this case, Judge Davis ruled that Ms. Munson had breached confidentiality not
because Ms. Munson had revealed the facts of the case to Dr. Jacobs, but because Ms.
Munson had provided the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter to Dr. Jacobs. Judge
Davis's ruling did not lead to chaos in this case, and it will not in the future if followed
by other courts. Any harshness of the rule—of which there is none here—could easily be
mitigated by the trial court in choosing the appropriate sanction. This case illustrates the
point. Judge Davis did not disqualify Dr. Jacobs from testifying and dismiss Ms.
Munson's case because she had no expert. Instead, Judge Davis ordered a mistrial,
giving Ms. Munson time to hire a new expert, with whom she could have shared the facts
which allegedly support her claim. The only restriction imposed by the trial court's
decision was that the new expert could not review and rely on confidential prelitigation
documents such as the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter, because if he did, Dr.
Chamberlain's counsel could not cross-examine him about them.
Ms. Munson is simply mistaken that the trial court's decision prevented her
lawyers from adequately trying her case. The trial court's decision merely recognized the
statutory duty on lawyers under section 78-14-12(l)(d) to keep confidential information
confidential, a duty all lawyers should readily recognize. See Utah R. of Prof. Conduct
1.6. Once the distinction between documents prepared for and submitted to the
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prelitigation panel and the underlying facts of the case is recognized, the chaotic picture
Ms. Munson paints fades away.
C.

The Court Should Not Create an Exception to Section 78-14-12(l)(d)
for Testifying Experts Because They Testify in Open Court Subject to
Cross-Examination.

Ms. Munson also overstates the effect of section 78-14-12(l)(d) by failing to
distinguish between testifying and non-testifying experts. Unlike with a non-testifying
expert, when confidential documents are provided to a testifying expert, the documents
are thereby exposed to the disclosure requirements of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and possible disclosure during cross examination of the expert witness. Utah
R. Civ. P. 26; Utah R. Evid. 705. Testifying experts must provide a written report that
discloses the "substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to
testify; [and] a summary of the grounds for each opinion."6 Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B);
(R. at 555, p. 14.) Thus, Dr. Jacobs had a duty to disclose the fact that he had received
the Notice of Intent and Opinion Letter. This is not a duty that would have been imposed
on expert consultants. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
Furthermore, the Utah Rules of Evidence allow for cross-examination of "the
underlying facts or data" relied on by the expert even if the expert had not previously
disclosed those facts or data. Utah R. Evid. 705; State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah
1982). In Clayton, the Utah Supreme Court held that once an expert renders an opinion
the opposing party may challenge the "'suitability or reliability of the witness' foundation
6

The trial court recognized this distinction and stated that if the opinion of the consulting
expert is disclosed to the testifying expert, Rule 26 would require disclosure of this fact.
(R. at 555, p. 14.)
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materials on cross-examination." 646 P.2d at 726. Therefore, by providing privileged
information to Dr. Jacobs, who was retained to testify at trial and therefore was subject to
cross-examination in open court, Ms. Munson breached the confidentiality requirement
under the statute.
There is no reason for the Court to carve out an exception to the statute to avoid
this result. The facts of this case illustrate why. If Dr. Jacobs had been allowed to testify,
Dr. Chamberlain's counsel would have faced a choice between two unacceptable courses
of action. Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could have chosen to fulfill his professional duty to
represent his client zealously and cross-examined Dr. Jacobs as to his reliance on the
confidential documents. However, this choice exposed counsel for Dr. Chamberlain to
possible sanctions, as counsel would have had to introduce the confidential documents
into evidence to question the expert about them.7
Dr. Chamberlain's counsel also could have chosen to respect the confidentiality of
the prelitigation proceedings. In so doing, however, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel would
have been forced to forego what, Dr. Chamberlain submits, would have been an effective
and revealing probe of Dr. Jacobs' credibility and the bases of his opinions.8 As Dr.
Chamberlain's counsel pointed out to Judge Davis, "[t]here are omissions, there are
7

It is not clear that this option is even available: "Evidence of the proceedings conducted
by the medical review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not
admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by the clamant in a court of
competent jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-15(1) (emphasis added).
8
Indeed, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel has an ethical duty to inquire into the basis of the
expert's testimony because of its importance to the case. One of the most fundamental
obligations a lawyer has is the obligation to act as a loyal advocate for his or her client.
Restatement 3d of Law Governing Lawyers, at § 16. As an advocate, a lawyer is charged
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inaccuracies, and it speaks to a relationship between [Dr. Kane and Dr. Jacobs] that I
think demonstrates bias and is certainly a fertile field for cross examination for me that I
am precluded from approaching because of confidentiality." (R. at 554, p. 8). In this
case, the Opinion Letter in particular demonstrates how Dr. Jacobs had simply adopted
the earlier opinion of Dr. Kane as well as showing that Dr. Jacobs had done a superficial
job of research while forming his opinions. Without the ability to introduce the
confidential documents, Dr. Chamberlain was unable to point out how Dr. Jacob's
opinion largely parrots Dr. Kane's opinion.9
For all these reasons, interpreting section 78-14-12(l)(d) to prevent disclosure of
prelitigation materials to testifying experts makes perfect sense, but the same rule does
not necessarily apply to non-testifying experts, the type of expert discussed in most of the
cases cited by Ms. Munson in her brief.10 In addition, carving out an exception for
testifying experts would undermine the purpose of the Act. If potential litigants must
guard against the possibility that evidence presented to the prelitigation panel will be
with "zealously asserting] the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."
Preamble to Utah R. of Prof. Conduct at [2].
9
Dr. Chamberlain's counsel had already indicated that he would decline to delve into the
confidential documents on cross examination. (R. at 555, p. 33).
10
Munson also relies upon In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 2002), as support for
her argument that "courts have long recognized that these expert witnesses must be able
to view, analyze, and testify regarding confidential information." (Aplt. Brief at 14.) She
then quotes the court as saying that "an attorney is permitted to consult with . .. experts
or professionals retained by the law firm to aid in the negotiation or structuring of the
settlement." (Id. at 15) The case and the quotation does not support her contention. The
court's quoted statement applies not to in-court testimony, but only to experts who aid in
settlement negotiations, an activity protected by Rule 408 fo the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Thus, in In Re Anonymous, in which the court found a breach of confidentiality, also
does not advance Munson's argument that testifying experts can review docuements
designated as confidential by the Legislature without breaching confidentiality.
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presented at trial, they will be far less likely to act with the candor necessary for the
prelitigation proceedings to be effective. As the trial court recognized here, to carve out
exceptions to the confidentiality requirement would create a "confused and unpredictable
juris prudence [sic] that would undermine the purposes" of the requirement, in particular,
the purpose of expediting "early settlement in an environment in which parties can speak
candidly without fear of subsequent disclosure of the proceedings, and critical documents
produced therein." (R. at 555, p. 44). Judge Davis's decision respects the importance of
maintaining the confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings, and far from leading to
absurd results, furthers the express purpose of the Legislature.
Ms. Munson responds to Judge Davis's decision by asserting that either she or
Judge Davis could have waived the privilege as to the confidential documents. (Aplt.
Brief at 20). This argument is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, there is no
contemplation of waiver in the Act, presumably because no one can "waive" the privilege
but the Legislature. Typically, a privilege may be waived by the entity whose interest it
is meant to protect. For example, the client may waive the attorney-client privilege.
Utah R. Evid. 504. Here, however, the confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings
protects more than just the parties to the controversy. The confidentiality rule protects
the interest of the state in providing confidential prelitigation proceedings and the
interests of the panel in having its decisions free from public disclosure and criticism.
Allowing a litigant to waive this confidentiality because it serves his or her litigation
purposes ignores the other interests protected by the confidentiality requirement.
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Second, a plain reading of the statue reinforces the conclusion that the
confidentiality simply can not be waived. The statute states that the prelitigation
proceedings are privileged and confidential and immune from civil process. Utah Code
78-14-12(l)(d). When reviewing a statute it is assumed that "each term in a statute was
used advisedly." Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d
1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (quotations and citation omitted). The prelitigation proceedings
are not merely privileged. To hold that a litigant or court may waive the privilege
attached to the prelitigation proceedings renders the words "confidential" and "immune
from civil process" meaningless. State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, f 19, 121 P.3d 42
(A statute should be read to "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative." (quotations and citation omitted)). A party cannot waive the
confidential classification of either the prelitigation proceedings or materials like the
Opinion Letter and Notice of Intent.
Furthermore, until the Legislature creates an exception to the confidentiality rule,
the Court should not read one into it. In Frederick, the Supreme Court refused to read a
waiver into a rule of confidentiality created for marriage and family therapists. 890 P.2d
1017. The statute established a privilege and enumerated four situations that subjected
the privilege to waiver. Id. at 1021. The court refused to interpret the statute to include
an additional waiver not expressly provided for in the language of the statute. See id.
The court stated that even if the statute's result was "infirm, amendments to correct the
inequities should be made by the legislature and not by judicial interpretation." Id.
(quoting Masich v. U.S. Smelting Ref. & Mining Co.. 191 P.2d 612, 625 (Utah 1948)).
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Here, section 78-14-12 does not provide for any exceptions to the confidentiality
requirement and there is no reason for the Court to read one into it.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Legislature has created numerous
confidentiality rules, and in some of the rules it has chosen expressly to list situations
where a waiver is possible, while not doing so in others. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 301-37 (1971) (information provided by marriage license applicant is strictly confidential);
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-17.1 (1969) (communications to domestic relations counselor are
confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-8,13 (2002) (information disclosed to Board of Oil,
Gas and Mining is confidential unless waived or mining operation terminates); Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3e-2 (1986) (identity of person informing about illegal activity at schools
is confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-313 (1981) (information on abortions is
confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 34-38-13 (2004) (results of employer tests for drugs or
alcohol are confidential subject to exceptions listed in the statute).
A fundamental maxim of statutory construction is "the expression of one should
be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98,
TJ30, 104 P.3d 1208 (quotations and citation omitted). The fact that the Legislature
provides exceptions to confidentiality in some statutes and not in others reinforces the
conclusion that the Legislature did not intend an exception to the confidentiality
requirement of section 78-14-12. The confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings is
neither Ms. Munson's nor the trial court's to waive. The only entity that has the power to
alter or waive the absolute rule of confidentiality is the Legislature. Therefore, this Court
should reject any notion that the concept of waiver applies to material prepared for the
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prelitigation panel.

There is no testifying-expert exception to the confidentiality

mandate in section 78-14-12(l)(d), and this Court should not create one.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
SELECTED A MISTRIAL AS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR MS.
MUNSON'S BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY.
Although Ms. Munson characterizes her opening brief as raising only questions of

law, in fact Ms. Munson argues that Judge Davis also erred by failing to implement
remedies other than ordering a mistrial. For example, Ms. Munson argues that Judge
Davis should have permitted only "a limited examination of Dr. Jacobs in camera," or
"cleared the courtroom" during Dr. Jacob's testimony, or allowed "that portion of the
cross-examination to be conducted under seal," or ordered counsel for Dr. Chamberlain
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Ms. Munson cites a long string of cases and states that the cases represent situations in
which a "court examined a discovery dispute and fashioned an order that expressly
allowed the disclosure of confidential information to the opposing party's expert
witness." (Aplt. Brief at 16.) Ms. Munson draws the conclusion from these cases that
courts consistently permit expert witnesses to view confidential information. (Id.). Ms.
Munson's interpretation of these cases, however, is overbroad. What these cases indicate
is that courts consistently permit expert witnesses, within the confines of a protective
order, to view the opposing party's confidential information. Court-ordered disclosure of
confidential information to the opposing side during discovery is not analogous to the
situation here. In this case, Munson disclosed confidential information from a sealed
legal proceeding to her own testifying witness. And unlike a protective order, which
protects or prevents the disclosure of sensitive information that could otherwise be
relevant to the case, see Utah R. Civ. Proc. 26(c), under section 78-14-12(l)(d), the
prelitigation proceedings are "confidential, privileged, and immune from the civil
process." Id The legislatively imposed confidentiality in the Act simply is unlike the
ordinary confidentiality required when a party wants to protect a trade secret, for
example. In the end, Munson's argument boils down to a plea for some type of a
protective order as a remedy for her breach of the confidentiality of the prelitigation
proceedings, something ancillary to whether Ms. Munson breached confidentiality in the
first place.
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to cross-examine "Dr. Jacobs regarding the documents in question without ever
discussing the prelitigation panel at all." (Aplt. Brief at 22-24.) Ms. Munson concludes
that because these alternative remedies were available, the trial court erred by declaring a
mistrial. (Id at 24.) These arguments challenge the sanction selected by Judge Davis,
not the legal issue of whether disclosure of the prelitigation documents to Dr. Jacobs
breached confidentiality, and therefore are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Castle. 951 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declaring a mistrial instead of
imposing the sanction Ms. Munson would have favored. The trial court specifically
considered Ms. Munson's proposed remedies and rejected them because it found a
mistrial to be the most equitable sanction and remedy. The trial court carefully
considered three possible sanctions for Ms. Munson's failure to preserve the
confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings: (i) to order a mistrial, allowing Ms.
Munson the opportunity to retain another expert; (ii) to allow Dr. Chamberlain to cross
examine Dr. Jacobs as to the effect of the confidential prelitigation documents on Dr.
Jacobs' ultimate opinion, which would have required Dr. Chamberlain's counsel to
breach the confidentiality provision himself; or (iii) to disqualify Dr Jacobs and dismiss
Ms. Munson's case because she lacked necessary expert testimony. The trial court
decided that a mistrial was the "most equitable sanction." (R. at 259). Far from being an
abuse of discretion that prejudiced Ms. Munson, the trial court's choice of sanction was,
in fact, favorable to Ms. Munson because it preserved Ms. Munson's ability to pursue the
cause of action. Ms. Munson merely had to retain a new expert, refrain from violating
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confidentiality again, and litigate the case. The trial court acted with utmost concern for
Ms. Munson's interests and did not abuse its discretion by ordering the mistrial. The
Court should affirm the trial court's decision to order a mistrial as a sanction for Ms.
Munson's breach of confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly ruled that Ms. Munson breached the confidentiality of the
prelitigation proceedings when she provided her testifying expert with confidential
documents from those proceedings. Furthermore, the trial court's selection of a mistrial
as the appropriate sanction was not an abuse of discretion. Instead, the trial court's
decision respected the sanctity of the prelitigation proceedings while preserving Ms.
Munson's cause of action. The Court should affirm.
DATED this 25th day of September, 2006.
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

Curtis J. DraKTe
Troy L. ©ooher
Attorneys for Appellee
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correct copy of the foregoing to be hand delivered to the following:
Kenneth Parkinson
Ryan D. Tenney
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, P.C.
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-14-12

c
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
CHAPTER 14. UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT
-•§ 78-14-12. Division to provide panel—Exemption—Procedures—Statute of
limitations tolled—Composition of panel—Expenses—Division authorized to
set license fees
»
(1)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical liability
cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, except dentists.
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration of
medical liability claims for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged
failure to provide health care.
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer the process and
procedures related to prelitigation hearings and the conduct of prelitigation
hearings in accordance with Sections 78-14-12 through 78-14-16.
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not subject to Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation.
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority
privileged, and immune from civil process.

of

this

section

are

confidential,

(2) (a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the service of a
statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8.
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence action.
The request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and
request.
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section
tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 days following
the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 days
following the termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided in this
subsection. The division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all
parties by regular mail.
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this section
within 180 days after the filing of the request for prelitigation panel review,
or within any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all parties to the
review.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-14-12
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the time limits
established in Subsection (3) (b) (i) , the division has no further jurisdiction
over the matter subject to review and the claimant is considered to have
complied with all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the
commencement of litigation.
(c) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written stipulation that no
useful purpose would be served by convening a prelitigation panel under this
section.
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division shall within
ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of jurisdiction over the
claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that the claimant
has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation
regarding the claim.
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or panels to
hear complaints of medical liability and damages, made by or on behalf of any
patient who is an alleged victim of medical liability. The panels are composed of:
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently licensed and in good standing
to practice law in this state and who shall serve as chairman of the panel, who
is appointed by the division from among qualified individuals who have registered
with the division indicating a willingness to serve as panel members, and a
willingness to comply with the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers in
the state of Utah, and who has completed division training regarding conduct of
panel hearings;
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under Section
78-14-3, who is practicing and knowledgeable in the same specialty as the
proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the division in accordance with
Subsection (5); or
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who is an
individual currently serving in a hospital administration position directly
related to hospital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the
area of practice that is the subject of the liability claim, and who is
appointed by the division; and
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other
health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected and
appointed by the division from among individuals who have completed division
training with respect to panel hearings.
(5) (a) Each person listed as a health care provider in Section 78-14-3 and
practicing under a license issued by the state, is obligated as a condition of
holding that license to participate as a member of a medical liability
prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issuance,
with advance notice given in a reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order
to Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel Member.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-14-12
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a panel member
upon the division finding participation by the licensee will create an
unreasonable burden or hardship upon the licensee.
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate as a
panel member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or justification and
without being excused for cause by the division, may be
assessed an
administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed to
appear and participate as a panel member when so ordered, without adequate
explanation or justification and without being excused for cause by the division,
may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, and is guilty of
unprofessional conduct.
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5) (c) and (d) shall be deposited in
the Physicians Education Fund created in Section 58-67a-l.
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he has
no bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consideration.
(7) Members of
the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per
diem
compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by
rules of the division.
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health
care providers, the division may set license fees of health care providers within
the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering
prelitigation panels.
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel
except under Section 78-14-16.
Current through end of 2006 Third Special Session
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984 P.2d 980
984 P.2d 980, 1999 UT 74, 376 Utah Adv. Rep. 15
(Cite as: 984 P.2d 980)

Supreme Court of Utah.
Jane DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Leigh A. MARET, John Heifer, and Psychiatric
Associates, Inc., Defendants and Appellees.
No. 970254.
Aug. 13, 1999.
Patient brought medical malpractice suit, alleging
that release of her psychological records to
ex-husband's attorney in prior divorce action caused
her to relinquish custody of children. Defendant
moved to compel testimony of attorneys who
represented patient in divorce. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake Department, David S. Young, J.,
granted motion. Patient appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham, Associate C.J., held that: (1)
patient's filing of medical malpractice suit did not
waive attorney-client privilege with respect to
communications made during divorce action; (2) by
volunteering information at deposition concerning
specific attorney-client communications of a
substantial nature, client waived attorney-client
privilege
with
respect
to those
specific
communications; and (3) notice of intent to
commence medical malpractice action is part of the
proceeding and must be kept confidential.
Affirmed as modified.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30 C=>856(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision
of Lower Court
30k856
Grounds
for
Sustaining

Decision Not Considered
30k856(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court will uphold a district court's ruling
of law on any ground made available to the court
below, whether expressly relied upon or not.
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €^842(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(2) k. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness.
[3] Witnesses 410 €^198(1)
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k 197 Communications to or Advice by
Attorney or Counsel
410kl98 In General
410k 198(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage
candor between attorney and client and promote the
best possible representation of the client.
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(2); Rules of Evid., Rule 504.
[4] Witnesses 410 €=^219(3)
410 Witnesses

41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
Privileged Communications
410k219 Waiver of Privilege

and
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984 P.2d 980, 1999 UT 74, 376 Utah Adv. Rep. 15
(Cite as: 984 P.2d 980)
410k219(3) k. Communications to or
Advice by Attorney or Counsel. Most Cited Cases
A party may waive the attorney-client privilege by
placing attorney-client communications at the heart
of a case, as where a party raises the defense of
good faith reliance on advice of counsel.
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(2); Rules of Evid., Rule 504.
[5] Witnesses 410 €=^219(3)
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k219 Waiver of Privilege
410k219(3) k. Communications to or
Advice by Attorney or Counsel. Most Cited Cases
Client did not waive attorney-client privilege with
respect to communications made during divorce
proceeding
by
filing
subsequent
medical
malpractice suit in which she alleged that improper
release of her psychological records to ex-husband's
attorney in divorce action caused her to relinquish
custody of children; while client's attorney in
divorce action may have learned information from
client bearing on her reason for relinquishing
custody, those communications were not at the heart
of malpractice claim. U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(2);
Rules of Evid., Rule 504.
[6] Witnesses 410 €^>198(1)
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k 197 Communications to or Advice by
Attorney or Counsel
410kl98 In General
410kl98(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Fact that a lawyer may have credible and important
information gained through communication with a
client does not itself justify the setting aside of the
attorney-client privilege, even when the lawyer is
the only non-party who may have that information.
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(2); Rules of Evid., Rule 504.
[7] Pretrial Procedure 307A €==>183.1

307A Pretrial Procedure
307AII Depositions and Discovery
307AII(C) Discovery Depositions
307AII(C)4 Scope of Examination
307Akl83 Privileged Matters
307Akl83.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
A continuing objection cannot effectively protect
privileged communications that depend upon
confidentiality for their privileged status if a
deponent voluntarily discloses that information.
[8] Pretrial Procedure 307A C=>183.1
307A Pretrial Procedure
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(C) Discovery Depositions
307AII(C)4 Scope of Examination
307Akl83 Privileged Matters
307Akl83.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
A question at a deposition calling for privileged
information cannot be answered subject to a later
judicial ruling on the propriety of the question.
[9] Witnesses 410 €=^219(3)
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k219 Waiver of Privilege
410k219(3) k. Communications to or
Advice by Attorney or Counsel. Most Cited Cases
When a client chooses to answer a question calling
for privileged material by disclosing privileged
communications with attorney, client waives
attorney-client privilege at least as to the disclosed
communications.
[10] Witnesses 410 €==>219(3)
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k219 Waiver of Privilege
410k219(3) k. Communications to or
Advice by Attorney or Counsel. Most Cited Cases
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(Cite as: 984 P.2d 980)
Deponent's responses to questions calling for
disclosure
of
insubstantial
communications
protected by attorney-client privilege did not waive
the privilege as to substantial matters. U.C.A.1953,
78-24-8(2); Rules of Evid., Rules 504, 507.

which patient, in earlier deposition in malpractice
action, made voluntary disclosures; patient by her
testimony waived attorney-client privilege with
respect to those conversations. U.C.A.1953,
78-24-8(2); Rules of Evid., Rules 504, 507.

[11] Trial 388 € ^ 7 6

[14] Health 198H €==>806

388 Trial
388IV Reception of Evidence
388IV(C) Objections, Motions to Strike Out,
and Exceptions
388k76 k. Time for Objection. Most Cited
Cases
An objection on cross-examination can only be
made to a question; an attorney cannot effectively
object to his client's answer once it has been given.

198H Health
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of
Duty
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings
198Hk806 k. Malpractice Panels in
General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 299kl7.5 Physicians and Surgeons)
Because the notice of intent to commence a medical
malpractice action serves as the basis for the
prelitigation panel review, and because it is often
utilized as part of the prelitigation review, it is part
of the proceeding and must be kept confidential.
U.C.A.1953, 78-14-1, 78-14-12(l)(d).

[12] Witnesses 410 €=^>219(3)
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k219 Waiver of Privilege
410k219(3) k. Communications to or
Advice by Attorney or Counsel. Most Cited Cases
To establish a waiver of attorney-client privilege, it
is not necessary to show that a client intended to
waive the privilege, but only that she intended to
make the disclosure. Rules of Evid., Rule 507.
[13] Witnesses 410 €^219(3)
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k219 Waiver of Privilege
410k219(3) k. Communications to or
Advice by Attorney or Counsel. Most Cited Cases
Defendant who was sued for medical malpractice,
based on allegation that release of patient's
psychological records to attorney representing
patient's husband in prior divorce action caused
patient to relinquish custody of her children, was
entitled to depose patient's divorce attorney
concerning only those conversations between
patient and attorney bearing on custody issue about
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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*982 Michael L. Schwab,Lloyd A. Hardcastle,
Farmington, for plaintiff.
David G. Williams, Terrence L. Rooney, Salt Lake
City, for defendants.
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice:
K 1 This case comes to us on interlocutory appeal.
The district court granted appellee Leigh A.
Maret's motion to compel the deposition testimony
of appellant Jane Doe's counsel from a prior case
involving a divorce and custody dispute ("prior
counsel"). The sole issue for review is whether
appellant waived the attorney-client privilege with
regard to communications with her prior counsel.
We affirm but modify the district court's ruling.

BACKGROUND
If 2 In this medical malpractice case, Doe claimed
that
defendants
wrongfully
provided
her
psychological records to her ex-husband's attorney
in the divorce and custody proceeding. The
psychological records were highly personal and
confidential. Ultimately, Doe voluntarily gave up
custody of her children and claims in this case that
she decided to relinquish custody of her children
iim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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because her ex-husband threatened to tell the
children about the information contained in the
records. Appellee Maret is the only defendant
remaining in the suit.
f 3 In the court below, Maret filed a motion to
compel the testimony of the attorneys who assisted
plaintiff in the custody dispute. Maret argued that
the Doe had waived the attorney-client privilege
protecting communications with her prior counsel
by placing her motivation for relinquishing custody
at issue in this case. Maret also argued that Doe
waived the privilege by providing voluntary
deposition
testimony
concerning
her
communications with prior counsel.
f 4 The district court granted Maret's motion to
compel, citing Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence as authority. However, the district court
failed to identify the specific provision of Rule 504
justifying its finding of waiver. At one point in the
hearing, the district judge offered some insight into
his reasoning by stating:
And I don't understand how it can be now that she
hasn't waived the privilege by filing this, by the
nature of this lawsuit. For instance, if the lawyer
were to testify that she didn't relinquish custody on
the basis of this released information, that she did it
on whatever other basis, then that would be very
credible and important information.
[1] 1 5 Maret correctly notes that this court will
uphold a district court's ruling of law on any ground
made available to the court below, whether
expressly relied upon or not. See Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). In
reliance upon this principle, Maret argues that the
district court's ruling can also be upheld on the
ground that Doe waived the privilege in her
deposition testimony under Rule 507 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
[2] % 6 We review the district court's conclusions
of law for correctness. See Jacobsen Inv. Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992).

ANALYSIS

[3] f 7 The attorney-client privilege "is intended to
encourage candor between attorney and client and
promote the best possible representation of the
client." Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick
Resources (USA), Inc., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah
1990). It is the oldest of the common law
privileges protecting confidential communications.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (citing
Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §
2290, Utah Code Ann. at 542 (McNaughten 1961)).
The privilege is recognized in Rule 504 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence FN1 as well as by statute at
*983§ 78-24-8(2) (1996). ™2 Although the
legislature and courts have carefully guarded the
integrity of the privilege, we have long held that it
can be waived by a client. See In re Young's Estate,
33 Utah 382, 385, 94 P. 731, 732 (Utah 1908).
FN1. Rule 504 reads as follows:
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, including a
public officer, or corporation, association
or other organization or entity, either
public or private, who is rendered
professional legal services by a lawyer, or
who consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or
reasonably believed by the client to be
authorized, to practice law in any state or
nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one
employed to assist the lawyer in a
rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A "representative of the client" is one
having authority to obtain professional
legal services, or to act on advice rendered
pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or
one
specifically
authorized
to
communicate with the lawyer concerning a
legal matter.
(5) A "communication" includes advice
given by the lawyer in the course of
representing the client and includes
disclosures of the client and the client's
representatives to the lawyer or the
lawyer's representative incidental to the
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professional relationship.
(6) A communication is "confidential" if
not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition
of professional legal services to the client
or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client
between the client and the client's
representatives,
lawyers,
lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing
others in matters of common interest, and
among the client's representatives, lawyers,
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers
representing others in matters of common
interest, in any combination.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The
privilege may be claimed by the client, the
client's guardian or conservator, the
personal representative of a deceased
client, or the successor, trustee, or similar
representative
of
a
corporation,
association, or other organization, whether
or not in existence. The person who was
the lawyer at the time of the
communication is presumed to have
authority to claim the privilege on behalf
of the client.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under
this rule:
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the
services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to
commit or plan to commit what the client
knew or reasonably should have known to
be a crime or fraud; or
(2) Claimants through same deceased
client. As to a communication relevant to
an issue between parties who claim
through the same deceased
client,
regardless of whether the claims are by
testate or intestate succession or by inter
vivos transaction; or

(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As
to a communication relevant to an issue of
breach of duty by the lawyer to the client
or by the client to the lawyer; or
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a
communication relevant to an issue
concerning a document to which the
lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication
relevant to a matter of common interest
between two or more clients if the
communication was made by any of them
to a lawyer retained or consulted in
common, when offered in an action
between any of the clients.
FN2. Section 78-24-8(2) of the Code
provides:
An attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him
or his advice given regarding the
communication in the course of his
professional employment. An attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be
examined, without the consent of his
employer, concerning any fact, the
knowledge of which has been acquired in
his capacity as an employee.
U 8 We first consider whether Doe waived the
attorney-client privilege under Rule 504. In
accordance with long-standing principles of
common law, Rule 504 affords a client a privilege
protecting
confidential
attorney-client
communications subject to five exceptions.
Specifically, the rule does not recognize a privilege
when (1) the legal services were sought in
furtherance of a crime or fraud, (2) the client has
died and the lawyer-client communications are
relevant to an issue between parties making claims
through the deceased client, (3) the lawyer and
client are themselves in dispute regarding an issue
of breach of duty, (4) the communication is relevant
to a document to which the lawyer was an attesting
witness, or (5) a dispute arises between joint clients
of the lawyer. None of these exceptions apply here.
[4][5] K 9 A party may also waive the privilege by
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placing attorney-client communications at the heart
of a case, as where a party raises the defense of
good faith reliance on advice of counsel. See, e.g.,
Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156,
1162-63 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that party's claim
that tax position was reasonable because based on
advise of counsel, waived the privilege); Conkling
v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir.1989)
(holding that when plaintiff alleged *984 that fraud
claim was not time-barred because he was unaware
of fraud until informed of it by his attorneys,
plaintiff waived privilege under federal rules);
Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Stanhope Prods., Co.,
Inc., 930 F.Supp. 45, 48-49 (W.D.N.Y.1996)
(holding that where attorney in patent infringement
was to testify as expert witness, plaintiff waived
privilege as to communications pertaining to patent
prosecution); United States v. Bernard, 877 F.2d
1463, 1465 (10th Cir.1989) (holding banker waived
privilege when he told victim he had checked
legality of proposed loan with attorney). Such is
not the case here. Whether Doe chose to relinquish
custody of her children in order to avoid further
dissemination of the contents of her psychological
records is a core issue in this case; whether she
discussed this with her attorney is not.
[6] If 10 Contrary to the district court's apparent
reasoning, the fact that a lawyer may have credible
and
important
information
gained
through
communication with a client does not itself justify
the setting aside of the privilege (even when the
lawyer is the only non-party who may have that
information). In many cases a lawyer may have
information gained through client communications
that would be of great utility to an opposing party in
the same or later litigation. Allowing an opposing
party to depose that attorney in such cases merely
because that evidence would be important and
credible would eviscerate the privilege. The same
rationale could be used to justify deposing a cleric
in whom Doe had confided simply because the
cleric might have relevant information about Doe's
motivations. Such a practice would not advance
the purposes of the privilege as it would not " '
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their
attorneys.' " Gold Standard, 801 P.2d at 911
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403,
96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976)).
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Accordingly, we hold that Doe did not waive the
attorney-client privilege under Rule 504 merely by
bringing a suit where her decision to relinquish
custody is at issue.
^| 11 Maret also argues that Doe's communications
with her prior counsel cannot be considered "
confidential" under Rule 504 because she has
discussed the details of those conversations in her
deposition. However, Rule 504 does not address
the issue of waiver. Rule 504 is only concerned
with defining whether a communication is
privileged at the time it is made. There is no
dispute that Doe's communications with her prior
counsel were intended to be confidential at the time
they were made. Whether Doe subsequently
waived the privilege is a question properly
considered under Utah Rule of Evidence 507.
K 12 Rule 507(a) provides:
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege
against disclosure of a confidential matter or
communication waives the privilege if the person or
a predecessor while holder of the privilege
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of
any significant part of the matter or communication,
or fails to take reasonable precautions against
inadvertent disclosure.
Utah R. Evid. 507(a). Maret argues that during
Doe's deposition she disclosed
information
regarding her communications with prior counsel
and thereby waived the privilege under Rule 507.
In opposition, Doe argues that the testimony at issue
took place after Doe's counsel had made a "
continuing objection" to all questions regarding
attorney-client communications and that this
objection prevented any subsequent waiver.
Because the nature and context of this objection is
important, we quote the discussion of it in its
entiretyrPLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Back on the
record. I have explained my understanding of the
attorney/client privilege to my client, also I
explained my understanding of the potential of
waiving that. There are certainly some things she
doesn't mind if you know but as with any
attorney/client privilege that there are certainly
things that she would rather be kept between her
and her attorney. For that reason she has decided
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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to assert the attorney/client privilege as to all
conversations between her and her counsel.
CO-DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL: We could do it a
couple of ways. I think that by bringing this
lawsuit and alleging what she alleges as damages
she has waived the privilege for her attorneys in her
divorce *985 action because she is alleging she
made decisions, she was damaged by the records
coming out, and so I think it is clearly relevant, and
I can ask some questions. You can assert the
privilege or not assert the privilege as you choose,
but what I am understanding you to say is if I ask
any questions about communications she had with
attorneys who helped her in her divorce action you
will assert attorney/client privilege; it that correct?
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: That is correct.
Although we respect your opinion, we disagree with
it. I believe any conversations with an attorney,
whether it be in the current litigation or previous
litigation, is still protected by the attorney/client
privilege. If I am wrong, then I guess we will let
the judge tell me I am wrong but as for this
deposition, we are asserting that privilege and she
will not be talking about those conversations.
CO-DEFENDANT'S
COUNSEL:
Well,
for
purposes of creating a record to make it clear for
the Court what kind of questions I would be asking,
/ will ask the questions and I assume you will object
to them ....
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: That's fine. Maybe to
save some time, rather than having me object after
each question, / will just state that in order not to
waive the attorney/ client privilege we don't feel
that we can talk about any conversations between
[appellant] and her attorney, especially involving
the divorce litigation that you are talking about.
So rather than objecting after each question, you
might want to read a list of the questions that you
would ask.
CO-DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL: Okay.
(Emphasis added.) Although the record is not
complete, it appears that co-defendant's counsel did
not in fact limit himself to a preliminary reading of
the list of questions he wanted to have answered.
Rather, at several points in the deposition he asked
Doe questions specifically calling for reference to
privileged material. Counsel for Doe did not
object to some of those questions, and Doe

answered them.
[7][8] [9] \ 13 This court has not had occasion to
consider the effect of so-called continuing
objections in this context. There are undoubtedly
many
circumstances
in
depositions
where
continuing objections may be effective and
desirable as a way to protect rights, preserve
arguments, and facilitate the deposition process.
However, a continuing objection cannot effectively
protect privileged communications that depend
upon confidentiality for their privileged status if a
deponent voluntarily discloses that information.
For this reason, when an attorney objects to a
question on the ground that it seeks material
protected by the attorney-client privilege, the
attorney typically also instructs the client not to
answer. For the same reason, "at a deposition a
question calling for privileged information cannot
be answered subject to a later judicial ruling on the
propriety of the question." 24 Charles Alan Wright
& Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 5507 (1986) (footnote omitted).
When a client chooses to answer a question calling
for privileged material by disclosing privileged
communications, she waives the privilege at least as
to the disclosed communications.
f 14 This principle appears to have been
understood by Doe's counsel. After he made the
continuing objection, he allowed several questions
to
be
asked
regarding
attorney-client
communications even though he had asserted earlier
that "we don't feel that we can talk about any
conversations between [appellant] and her attorney."
None of the questions he allowed her to answer
concerned substantive issues, however. In contrast,
when opposing counsel asked substantive questions
regarding
privileged
communications,
Doe's
counsel objected (despite the earlier discussion) and
his client refused to answer:
Q: Did [appellant's former counsel] discuss with
you that because of your protective order complaint
that there might be an argument that you had
waived or given up the privilege to hold those
documents as being private?
A: No.
APPELLANTS COUNSEL: Hold on just a
second, I think in my mind you have *986 crossed
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the line. I have been trying to be as lax as I could
for the sake of moving this case forward letting you
talk about what she and her attorney discussed as
far as procedural matters. I believe the question
crosses the line and gets into the merits of what they
were discussing regarding the case and strategy. I
believe that crosses the line. In addition to
attorney-client privilege, I don't think that is an
appropriate question.
Q: Are you going to follow your counsel's advice on
that point.
A: Yes.
If 15 Implicit in the objection of Doe's counsel is
his determination that the questions asked
previously had not sought "a significant part" of the
privileged communications and thus answering
them could not constitute waiver under Rule 507.
When opposing counsel asked a question that called
for disclosure of matters that were arguably of
significance, Doe's counsel properly objected and
his client invoked the privilege.
[10] If 16 We agree with Doe that her responses to
questions calling for disclosure of insubstantial
communications protected by the attorney-client
privilege did not waive the privilege as to
substantial matters. We reach this conclusion not
because the continuing objection based on the
attorney-client privilege protected Doe from
waiving it when she disclosed privileged material (it
did not), but rather because her answers to the
questions calling for privileged material did not
reveal a significant part of the privileged
communications as contemplated by Rule 507.
f 17 However, at two points in her deposition, Doe
disclosed the contents of significant privileged
communications in response to questions that did
not call for the disclosure of privileged
communications. In other words, she volunteered
the information.1™3

FN3. The content of these disclosures was
as follows:
Q: And in your lawsuit, in your divorce
lawsuit at that time and, in fact, throughout

the time period from the time you
answered the complaint through the end of
September, you were seeking to keep your
kids and keep them in your marital home,
weren't you?
A: Yes, I was.
Q: For you to have possession of the home
and be able to live there with your kids.
Right?
A: But I was also afraid of the fact that my
husband was going to tell my children and
I thought about that since the day that it
happened, and / discussed it with my
attorney and she told me if I ever gave up
custody of my children there would
probably be no way to get them back.
Q: How did that agreement to resolve your
divorce action come about?
A: I just told my attorney that I couldn't
handle the fact that I may possibly lose my
kids every day that I went to court, that I
was tired of all the court proceedings that
we had been to, that I knew my husband
would never stop, and that if I did get
custody of the children that he would tell
the kids what had happened to me.
(Emphasis added.)
[11] If 18 Doe argues that because these answers
were "non-responsive," counsel could not have
objected to the question and therefore the answer
cannot be viewed as a waiver of the privilege. Doe
is half-right. An objection can only be made to an
attorney's question; an attorney cannot effectively
object to his client's answer once it has been given.
However, this fact has no bearing on whether there
has been a waiver. In Utah, the question of
whether the disclosure constituted a waiver turns on
whether the disclosure was voluntary or excusably
inadvertent. See Utah R. Evid. 507 (a privilege
holder waives the privilege by voluntarily
disclosing significant matter or by failing to take
reasonable steps to prevent inadvertent disclosure);
see generally John T. Hundley, Waiver of
Evidentiary
Privilege
by
Inadvertent
Disclosure-State Law, 51 A.L.R. 5th 603, 634
(1997).
[12] f 19 It is difficult to view this case as one of
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inadvertent disclosure as contemplated by Rule 507.
Such inadvertence is typically found in the context
of document disclosure. See Waiver of Evidentiary
Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure, 51 A.L.R. 5th
at 635. The notion of inadvertence is not
applicable in the context of a deposition where, as
here, counsel has carefully explained the legal
consequences of disclosure to his client but the
client nonetheless chooses to volunteer details
concerning privileged communications. Rule 507
recognizes waiver when a privilege holder "
voluntarily discloses"*987 privileged material; it
does not ask whether the disclosure was made with
specific intent to waive the privilege. Thus, it is
not necessary under Rule 507 to show that a client
intended to waive the privilege but only that she
intended to make the disclosure. See Tennenbaum
v. Deloitte & Touche, 11 F.3d 337, 341 (9th
Cir.1996) ("the focal point of privilege waiver
analysis should be the holder's disclosure ... not the
holder's intent to waive the privilege"); United
States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 741 n. 13 (10th
Cir.1990) (holding that voluntary disclosure is
sufficient to waive the privilege); Goldsborough v.
Eagle Crest Partners Ltd, 314 Or. 336, 838 P.2d
1069,
1073
(1992)
(holding
that
once
confidentiality is destroyed by disclosure, privilege
is waived); Freeman v. Bianchi, 820 S.W.2d 853,
861 (Tex.App.1991) ("we do not interpret the term '
voluntary' to encompass only disclosures that are
made intentionally
and knowingly."). This
reasoning is all the more persuasive in
circumstances, such as those here, where a party
selectively discloses some privileged information to
gain an advantage in litigation. Cf. State v. Hoben,
36 Utah 186, 198, 102 P. 1000, 1004 (1909)
(holding that when a client testifies as to some
privileged communications with his attorney, he
may not be heard to complain when his attorney is
called to impeach him).
[13] T| 20 We conclude that by volunteering
information concerning specific attorney-client
communications of a substantial nature during the
course of deposition testimony, Doe has waived the
privilege. However, we hold Doe's waiver to be
limited to the particular subject matter and the
conversation disclosed by Doe in her deposition
testimony referred to in footnote three of this
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

opinion. Accordingly, we modify the district
court's ruling as follows: Maret is entitled to
depose the attorney with whom, according to Doe's
voluntary disclosure, she communicated. The
deposition questions should be limited to the
communications concerning the disclosed subject
matter as quoted in footnote three.
[14] f 21 We turn now to an unrelated issue.
Maret, in his brief before this court, made reference
to and quoted from Doe's "Notice of Intent to
Commence Malpractice Action." In addition,
Maret attached a copy of the notice as an
addendum. Section 78-14-1 of the Utah Code
mandates that medical malpractice actions be
initiated with the filing of a notice of intent.
Section 78-14-12(l)(d) provides that the "
proceedings conducted under authority of this
section are confidential, privileged, and immune
from civil process." Utah Code Ann. §
78-14-12(l)(d) (1996). Whether the notice of
intent is part of the prelitigation "proceeding" has
never been determined by this court. Today we
hold that because the notice of intent serves as the
basis for the prelitigation panel review, and because
it is often utilized as part of the prelitigation review,
it is part of the proceeding and must be kept
confidential. Although we decline to impose
sanctions for Maret's disclosure, particularly in view
of the heretofore unsettled status of the notice,
failure
to
keep
prelitigation
proceedings
confidential may in the future result in sanctions.
H 22 Chief Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART,
Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice RUSSON
concur in Associate Chief Justice DURHAM'S
opinion.
Utah, 1999.
Doe v. Maret
984 P.2d 980, 1999 UT 74, 376 Utah Adv. Rep. 15
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
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BRUCE H. CHAMBERLAIN, M.D. and
CENTRAL UTAH MEDICAL CLINIC,
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- • Case No.050100024
, Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.
Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record, hereby appeals from the Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Order of Mistrial entered by the above-entitled Court on April
24,2006.

,

. r.

DATED this Q__ day of May, 2006.

KENNETH PARKgSSON, and
RYAN D. TENNEY for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

Curtis J. Drake [A0910]
Tammy B. Georgelas [A9972]
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendants
Bruce H. Chamberlain, M.D. and
Central Utah Medical Clinic

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
REBEKAH MUNSON,

ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 050100024
vs.
Judge Derek P. Pullan
BRUCE H. CHAMBERLAIN, M.D. and
CENTRAL UTAH MEDICAL CLINIC,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider the Order of Mistrial ("Motion to Reconsider") and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment were heard by the Honorable Derek P. Pullan,
Fourth District Judge, on March 29, 2006 at 2:30 p.m. Plaintiff was represented by Kenneth
Parkinson.

Defendants were represented by Curtis J. Drake. The Court had reviewed the

pleadings which were filed by the parties. The Court noted the parties' respective positions with
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respect to the order in which the two motions should be heard and chose to first hear oral
argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.
Motion to Reconsider
Generally speaking, Plaintiff argues that manifest injustice will result if this Court does
not reconsider Judge Lynn W. Davis's Order of Mistrial of March 26, 2004 ("Order of
Mistrial"). Plaintiff contends that Doe v. Maret 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999) is limited to its facts
and does not prohibit counsel from providing a testifying expert witness with confidential
documents in this instance. Plaintiff contends that classifying as confidential the subject notice
of intent to commence action and the report of her consulting expert, Dr. Greg Kane ("Notice of
Intent" and "Dr. Kane's Report", respectively) would produce an absurd result that was not
intended by the Utah state legislature ("Legislature") in enacting Utah Code Ann. §78-1412(l)(d) (2002). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the confidentiality of the Notice of Intent and of
Dr. Kane's Report can be waived.
Defendants contend that there is insufficient cause to reconsider the Order of Mistrial.
Defendants assert that Doe v. Maret, supra, is controlling. Defendants further argue that the
confidentiality of the Notice of Intent and of Dr. Kane's Report cannot be waived. Finally,
Defendants assert that they were prejudiced at trial by the inability to cross-examine Dr.
Alexander Jacobs with respect to both the Notice of Intent and Dr. Kane's Report.
The Court finds that the Legislature intended to extend confidentiality to all materials
which are used in a prelitigation panel hearing. Doe v. Maret supports this interpretation. The
Legislature has not made any exceptions to this provision, and it would be inappropriate for this
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Court to carve out a judicial exception. The Court also finds that the confidentiality status which
attached to the Notice of Intent and to Dr. Kane's report cannot be waived. The Court finds that
Defendants were prejudiced by the inability to cross-examine Plaintiffs expert witness with
respect to the content of the Notice of Intent and Dr. Kane's report. Finally, the Court finds that
the decision by Judge Davis, as reflected in the Order of Mistrial, was well reasoned; this Court
adopts the Order of Mistrial as consistent with its ruling.
Based upon the foregoing, the Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
Motion for Summary Judgment
After hearing argument and after ruling on the Motion to Reconsider, the Court inquired
of counsel for Plaintiff whether it was conceded that the denial of the Motion to Reconsider
would be dispositive of the Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel responded by affirming
that Dr. Alexander Jacobs is Plaintiffs only expert witness. Counsel for Plaintiff offered no
further argument.
The Court then inquired of counsel for Defendants whether argument on the Motion for
Summary Judgment was desired. Counsel responded by submitting the Motion for decision
based up on the memoranda on file.
The Court finds that, based upon its denial of the Motion to Reconsider, Dr. Alexander
Jacobs, Plaintiffs only expert witness, is not qualified to render opinions regarding the standard
of care for Defendants.

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of

negligence against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
DATED this

?if

day of

^SML

, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

DerfejcEPullan • - / ; /
istrict Judge
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OF COUNSEL
S. Rex Lewis

December 31, 2001

Alexander Jacobs, M.D.
3300 East 17th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80206
RE:

Rebekah Munson v. Bruce H. Chamberlain, M.D. & Central Utah Medical Clinic

Dear Dr. Jacobs:
We were referred to you by Dr. Greg Kane to review the above case for us. I am
enclosing the following documents for your review:
1.

Copy of draft of Notice of Intent to Commence Action - outlines the facts and
liability issues of the case.

2.

Copy of Dr. Richard Call's medical records - Ms. Munson first saw Dr. Call for
her complaints of pain.

3.

Copy of Dr. Bruce Chamberlain's and Central Utah Medical Clinic's records Diagnosis of polymyositis and treatment.
Copy of Dr. Richard Gremillion's records - correct diagnosis and treatment
following treatment of Dr. Chamberlain.

5.

Copy of Dr. Richard Rosenthal's records - chronic pain treatment.

6.

Copy of Dr. Joseph Watkins' records - EMG Studies

7.

Copy of Dr. Doug Jones' records - Family physician

8.

Copy of Utah Valley Regional Medical Center emergency room records for
12/18/98 - diagnosis of myositis

Alexander Jacobs, M.D.
December 31, 2001
Page 2

Also enclosed is a check in thejuaoun^ef-$566^30Hfe^
as well as a copy
of the initial review by Dr. GrefKane. If you need any additional^nedical records or
information, please let me knew. Once you have had a chance to review the enclbsed materials,
please contact my paralegaK Heather Finch to arrange a phone appointment.
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